Two weeks of intense negotiations at the UN climate talks in Doha concluded within minutes on December 8. Abdullah Bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, president of the 18th Conference of Parties (COP), gavelled through the draft decisions of three negotiating tracks and adopted them. In what seemed a premeditated attempt, every strike of the gavel was accompanied by a deafening applause which ensured dissenting voices did not reach the podium.
Any objection to a draft decision must be raised before the president adopts it, according to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Al-Attiyah, through several hours of huddles with groups of countries, ensured the dissenting voices were few. Except for the Russian Federation, Al-Attiyah had convinced all countries not to let the talks collapse. It did not matter, of course, whether the outcome was in favour of arresting catastrophic global climate change or not.
COP-18 should have closed on December 7, but till 4 am on December 8, three different draft texts were on the table and the negotiating countries, or Parties, did not see eye to eye on any of them. These texts pertained to the three negotiating tracks, called ad hoc working groups, on Kyoto Protocol, Long-Term Cooperative Action (LCA) and Durban Platform (ADP). Over the two weeks since talks began on November 26, countries had put forth their proposals and each group wanted its interests reflected in the draft texts. But this was not possible because interests of developing countries are considerably different and they wanted different outcomes from the talks at Doha.
Through the second week, negotiations went into a tizzy, with negotiators working 20-hour shifts to ensure their countries’ interests were taken care of. Talks seemed set for a collapse because of extremely divergent views. But the COP president changed this in four hours.
Early December 8 morning, Al-Attiyah introduced new draft texts, claiming everyone’s interests had been accommodated. He gave Parties 90 minutes to read the texts, but the break stretched to well over 10 hours. It remains a mystery how he convinced countries not to object before he adopted the decisions. Unconfirmed reports note the COP president and the UNFCCC secretariat met several key parties behind closed doors, convincing them that to open the “package of texts” at the late juncture to make further adjustments would cause utter chaos.
Drama unravelled soon after. The Russian Federation found it “unbelievable that the decisions were passed so unforgivingly”. Not happy with the decision to disallow transfer of surplus carbon credits to the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the Russian negotiator said: “It is difficult to believe that you did not hear the nameplate that I banged (to bring to the president’s attention the country’s wish to intervene before he adopted the decision), which is against the nature of Russian diplomacy.” To this the president replied, “I value the warm relations between my country and the Russian Federation. It was my sense that the decision reflects the will of the party as a whole to resolve Doha.”
Then, the US sprung its card. It made clear that it would not be part of any new global deal that was guided by the principles of UNFCCC. In other words, even though the talks were being held under the Convention, it did not want any future climate regimes to be under the Convention’s principles. Early signs of this had been visible during the wrangling between developed and developing countries on the use of the phrase ‘guided by the principles’ in the draft decision under ADP. Developing countries insisted that it should be explicitly written that ADP would be guided by the principles of UNFCCC and that it would operate on the principles of equity and CBDR, or common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR). But the final text omitted reference to these two ideas. The US and other developed countries even put their foot down at the mention of a passing reference to the June 2012 Rio+20 summit, which endorsed the principles of equity and CBDR in its decision, in the ADP draft text.
Responding to the US’ statement post adoption, India made it equally clear that future negotiations would be difficult if they are not based on the principles of the Convention. “We have heard arguments that equity cannot be the basis of our work. That our work will be anchored in the principles of the Convention was a clear understanding when we agreed to the Durban Platform. The phrase ‘under the Convention’ was coined to give comfort to all parties who did not want an explicit reference to equity and CBDR,” said lead Indian negotiator Mira Mehrishi.
India also made it clear that it was not happy with most parts of the text. “These are serious issues that affect the interests of all developing countries. There is no framework for sectoral measures in the decision. The unilateral measures have been dealt with almost as an afterthought. And, there is a weak reference to technology-related intellectual property rights issues. Most important, there is no concrete commitment on financing,” Mehrishi said.
Reiterating the focus on equity and CBDR in the context of shared vision, India reserved its right to be party to the Doha decisions only if others accepted all the elements and provisions enshrined in the decisions. “The entire package must be treated as a composite one and not violated either in spirit or letter,” Mehrishi warned, setting the tone for the next three years of talks.
See also: Doha: inaction in the face of urgency
Ad hoc working group on Kyoto Protocol | |
ISSUES ON THE TABLE | DECISIONS TAKEN |
Decision on the length of the second commitment period | Eight years—from January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2020. But the targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are very weak |
Whether to trade surplus allowances or Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) from the first commitment period to the second commitment period | Decision not to trade surplus AAUs in the second commitment period |
Decision on whether to allow countries not party to the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol to use carbon offsets from Clean Development Mechanism, or CDM projects towards meeting their emissions reduction commitments | Countries that are not party to the second commitment period will not be allowed access to certified emissions reduction, or CERs |
Ad hoc working group on Durban Platform (ADP) | |
ISSUES ON THE TABLE | DECISIONS TAKEN |
Expand scope of work stream I, on what the post-2020 framework should look like | ADP decided to hold roundtables and workshops in 2013 to work towards the post-2020 framework |
Expand scope of work stream II, on how to enhance ambition in the pre-2020 period | Decision to “identify and explore in 2013 options for a range of actions that can close the pre-2020 ambition gap with a view to identifying its plan of work in 2014” and hold roundtables and workshops in 2013 and produce a technical paper compiling information on mitigation benefits in 2012 |
Ad hoc working group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (LCA) | |
ISSUES ON THE TABLE | DECISIONS TAKEN |
Long-term finance | No decision on how the goal of US $100 billion per year by 2020 will be achieved. A work programme extended to 2013 end to discuss how the funds will be mobilised |
Technology transfer | Diluted mention of Intellectual Property Rights. Decision states that the Technology Executive Committee should “initiate the exploration of issues relating to enabling environments and barriers…” |
Adaptation | A meagre mention that the bodies “under the Convention will continue their work to enhance action on adaptation…” |
Loss and damage | Decision on establishing “institutional arrangements such as institutional mechanism…to address loss and damage...” |
Shared vision, including issues such as peaking year for developed and developing countries | Parties are to only attain a global peaking of emissions at the earliest; the timeframe for peaking will be longer in developing countries |
Cooperative sectoral approaches, including emissions under aviation and maritime sectors | Stronger text on sectoral approaches deleted in the final version of the draft text. The only caution in the draft text is that such measures “should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination...” |
REDD (Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries) | No decision. The issue will be taken up for discussion under the subsidiary body |
AGRICULTURE RESISTED
In addition, the G77 and China group are of the view that counting emissions from farmland could pave the way to opening the sector to cheap emissions reduction credits, thereby exposing them to the vagaries of the carbon market. A proposal by the EU and Costa Rica, however, stated that agriculture should be considered for mitigation and a decision on that must be taken in Doha. The countries found support in the least developed countries’ (LDC) group, which stressed that studies need to be carried out to ascertain the role of agriculture in global warming. Gambia, the chair of the LDC group, went back on the agreed position of G77 and China of keeping agriculture outside the scope of mitigation. They suggested that the principle of common but differentiated responsibility be removed from the Convention’s text for Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), the UNFCCC body discussing agriculture. Since consensus could not be reached, the issue has been pushed to the next SBSTA meeting in Bonn. |
Dirty mechanism
But despite the billionth CER issued in September 2012, the future of this system looks dodgy. Lack of ambitious emissions reduction targets by developed countries means less demand for CERs. CER prices reached a historic low in December. It was trading at 46 Euro cents at the ICE Futures Europe exchange in London, reports Bloomberg. In 2006, CERs were trading at close to 30 Euros. Generation of numerous fake CERs from questionable industrial projects, such as coal-based power plants, has added to the depression in prices. CDM mechanism has no way to guarantee avoidance of double accounting. The developing country, where the CDM projects are installed, and the developed country, which buys these credits, could both add these avoided emissions into their own mitigation targets. The additionality clause in the CDM mechanism demands that the project can qualify only if it cannot be set up under a “business as usual” scenario. By this the project will have to prove that the policy of the country where the project has been set up does promote such projects and without finance generated through CERs the project will not be able to break even. But the additionality clause is often ignored. Qualification of coal-powered plants, which are not additional, has not only led to dirty CERs being generated but has also hindered developing countries from adopting a low-carbon trajectory. |
See also: Doha: inaction in the face of urgency
TECH TRAP
Except for the creation of a technology executive committee at Cancun, there has been little movement on technology transfer and intellectual property rights (IPR) related to environmentally sound technologies (ESTs). While developing countries say the current IPR regime does not match the need to transfer technologies, countries such as the US want developing countries to create “an enabling atmosphere to attract private funds for ESTs”. Thus, while developing countries want innovative IPR- sharing arrangements to develop ESTs, or process for compulsory licensing for patented ESTs, the US wants IPR enforcement and protection and promotion of competitive and open markets for ESTs. This has been the nub of the debate. At the recently concluded talks in Doha, developed countries refused to entertain any exclusive proposal by developing countries on technology transfer. In fact, under the Ad hoc working group on Long-term Cooperative Action, the draft text on technology was heavily diluted in the final decision adopted. It merely states that technology executive committee should “initiate exploration of issues relating to enabling environments and barriers”, leaving scope for further disagreements in future climate talks. |
See also: Doha: inaction in the face of urgency
Countries must address enhanced action on adaptation: this is what the Bali Action Plan, signed at COP-13, had stated in 2007. Five years later, action on adaptation has been anything but enhanced.
Reaffirming that adaptation was a challenge, COP-18 listed the progress made so far. It included “approval of the three-year work plan of the Adaptation Committee, implementation of the work programme on loss and damage,” and setting up of processes to formulate and implement national adaptation plans. A close look reveals the key questions that had dogged the world in 2007 remain unanswered—“whose responsibility is it?” and “who pays?”
COP-13 had witnessed vociferous demands for a new financial architecture to fund adaptation, which was predictable, stable and adequate. China proposed a programme with new financial resources and transfer of technology. There were sticking points though: developed countries did not like the “legally binding” nature of the proposals, while for developing countries, international monitoring and review were anathema. The Adaptation Fund was operationalised under the Kyoto Protocol at COP-14 in Poznan, Poland. But the Fund could never accumulate enough to meet the adaptation needs of developing countries. In 2009 came the Copenhagen Accord, which announced the Green Climate Fund. Developed countries committed to provide resources up to US $30 billion for adaptation and mitigation from 2010 to 2012. They also committed to mobilise US $100 billion per year by 2020 for mitigation.
But the Accord was silent on some basic questions: who will contribute, and how much? Will the money come from public or private source? Who will get the funds and on what basis? What was far more dangerous was the effort to divide the developing world—between what it called the “emerging economies” (countries which did not need climate funds) and the “vulnerable nations” (those impacted by changing climate).
The Climate Adaptation Framework and an Adaptation Committee, created in 2010 at Cancun, Mexico, set out priority areas for action, but contentious questions such as how adaptation funds will be allocated, remained unresolved. The Durban Platform that followed did not find it worthwhile to spend time on adaptation or its funding.
Doha Gateway, as the outcome of COP-18 is being referred to, acknowledges that adaptation must be addressed with the same priority as mitigation. It has requested “the Adaptation Committee to consider the establishment of an annual adaptation forum, to be held in conjunction with the sessions of the Conference of the Parties, to maintain a high profile for adaptation under the Convention, to raise awareness and ambition with regard to adaptation actions and to facilitate enhanced coherence of adaptation actions”. But with no decision taken on the crucial funding yet, adaptation remains a proverbial blind alley in this maze of global climate negotiations.
LOSS & DAMAGE
The final decision adopted at Doha states that the institutional arrangements would be established at the 19th Conference of Parties, to be held in Warsaw, Poland, in 2013. While negotiations on how the mechanism will translate on the ground are not expected to be smooth, developing countries consider Doha as a win on loss and damage because the decision was formally adopted after many years of wrangling. |
See also: Doha: inaction in the face of urgency